Two Postdoctoral Researchers in Theoretical Philosophy

Tiivistelmä työpaikkailmoituksesta: The University of Helsinki is hiring two four‑year postdoctoral researchers for the Research Council of Finland project "the Epistemic Significance of Concepts" starting in April 2027. Postdoctoral duties include authoring peer‑reviewed articles, collaborating on joint publications, organising and attending international conferences and workshops, preparing grant applications, and providing research‑based teaching (about 5–10% of time). Applicants must hold or complete a doctoral degree (preferably in philosophy) with a publication record, have excellent English, and ideally bring expertise at the intersection of psychology, cognitive science, linguistics and philosophy, with generally no more than three years of prior postdoctoral experience. The starting salary will be approximately 4000–4400 €/month before taxes, the position includes a 2000 €/year travel budget and a six‑month trial period, and applications must be submitted by 30th of November. Tämä tiivistelmä on luotu tekoälyn avulla. The Research Council of Finland-funded project “the Epistemic Significance of Concepts” based at Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki invites applications for two (2) fixed-term Postdoctoral Researcher positions. The positions are for four years, starting in April 2027 (or later as agreed). Position description The positions belong to a research project “the Epistemic Significance of Concepts” led by Academy Professor Maria Lasonen. The project is funded by the Research Council of Finland. The project will work alongside another project on concepts funded by the European Research Council, but its aims are complementary to those of the ERC project. Conceptual resources are crucial from an epistemic perspective. Having the right concepts allows asking the right questions, formulating new hypotheses, and providing good explanations. New concepts are often needed for developing theories that systematize data and make accurate predictions. Good concepts are projectable, providing a sound basis for inductive reasoning. They enable communicating one’s own experiences and recognizing various forms of injustice. In short, concepts enable acquiring knowledge and understanding – whether about the subatomic world, moral reality, or our own social experiences – that is otherwise out of reach. And on the flipside: inapt concepts can result in widespread ignorance. This project aims to ask epistemological questions about concepts in an empirically informed way. These questions include but are not restricted to the following: What are concepts, and what do they allow us to do? What is their epistemic role? How do cognitive scientists and psychologists think about concepts? What are recognitional abilities, and how do they relate to concepts? How are concepts and linguistic meaning related? Can work on lexical competence shed light on conceptual competence? What makes for an epistemically good concept or distinction? Do epistemically good concepts track metaphysically privileged categories? How should considerations of cognitive limitations and architecture inform our account of epistemically good concepts? Could we offer a unified theory of epistemically good concepts that bridges the gap between scientific concepts designating natural kinds and non-scientific concepts with similar epistemic benefits (supporting inductive inference, figuring in good explanations and generalisations, etc.)? Does AI use concepts and if so, how can we tell which concepts it deploys? How can we impact which concepts AI deploys? Can we make rational or reasonable decisions about which new concepts to adopt? What are some robust case studies of new, epistemically good concepts from both the natural and social sciences? How do social practices shape the thinking of individuals by impacting which concepts they deploy and what information is associated with these concepts? How can we understand such social influences in a way that fits with an externalist and referentialist view of language and the mind? What sort of account can we provide of the role of concepts in inference without relying on inferentialism? What can we learn about the distorting view of concepts from the Marxist and feminist traditions and the philosophy of race? How do concepts compete with other concepts? How do concepts relate to unawareness and ignorance? What is the role of concepts in understanding? What is the role of concepts in moral epistemology? Do thick concepts play a special role in moral knowledge and understanding? To what extent does the role of thick concepts in moral epistemology rely on a view about the semantics of thick terms? Since the PI of the project is an epistemologist, the postdoctoral researchers being hired will bring in complementary expertise from outside epistemology. Responsibilities and assessment of qualifications The postdoctoral researchers will be responsible for Authoring peer-reviewed journal articl